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Abstract
We study the impact of environmental regulations on the patent activities for
wind turbines between 1980 and 2008. We explicitly control for energy market
liberalisation and take a potential interaction between liberalisation and policy in-
struments into account. We ﬁnd a strong and highly signiﬁcant effect of environ-
mental tax revenues, which we regard as a proxy for the extent to which energy
prices changed in favour of renewable energies, as well as foreign demand for wind
turbines on innovation activities. In addition, we ﬁnd that price-based policy instru-
ments are more effective in fostering innovations in the wind turbine technology
when energy markets are fully open to competition. In contrast, non-price-based
policy instruments such as grants or low interest rate loans are largely independent
from whether or not energy markets are liberalised.
Keywords: Environmental policy, renewable energy, market structure, wind tur-
bines, innovation, patents, technological change
JEL Classiﬁcation: Q55, Q58, O34, O38
1 Introduction
The oil price shocks in the 1970s made it painfully clear how much the development and the
welfare of countries depend on a steady and affordable energy supply. Therefore, it is not sur-
prising that governments, especially in industrialised countries, initiated research programs that
looked for alternative energy sources in order to improve the security of energy supply. The in-
creasing concerns about climate change and global warming renewed and reinforced the interest
in non-fossil energy sources as they promise to lastingly reduce greenhouse gases. According
to Popp et al. (2010), the efforts to reduce carbon emissions have primarily driven investments
into renewable energy sources.
Due to the global public good/bad characteristics of global warming (see e.g. Nordhaus, 2001,
p. 1284), any effective intervention has to be supra-national. With a multitude of diverging
interests, it is exceedingly difﬁcult to reach an efﬁcient global global climate protection regime.
The conclusion of the Kyoto Protocol in 1997 is therefore a remarkable step in the pursuit of
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efﬁcient international climate protection. In the wake of the Kyoto Protocol, all participating
industrialised countries had to adapt their laws. As a consequence, new research programs were
established and a number of new policy instruments were introduced. Hahn and Kammen (1992,
p. 466) stress: “In the long run, the effect of public policies on technological change may be
among the most important determinants of success in environmental protection”.
Especially with respect to the management of long-term threats like climate change, the con-
tinued development and deployment of technologies, which cannot quite yet compete in the
market, is pressing (see Arrow et al., 2009). According to Barrett (2009, p. 73): “[s]tabilizing
atmospheric concentrations will require fundamental and comprehensive changes in technol-
ogy.” Thus, identifying policy approaches and instruments, which support the development of
newandimprovedtechnologies, isacrucialtaskinanysolutionfortheglobalwarmingproblem.
There are only a few early empirical studies which try to establish a link between environ-
mental regulations as a whole and innovative activities. According to Porter (1991), adequate
environmental regulations can exert the necessary outside pressure in the innovation process that
is necessary to overcome obstacles such as organisational inertia (see also Porter and van der
Linde, 1995, p. 100). Yet, Jaffe and Palmer (1997) criticise that Porter (1991) offers merely
anecdotal evidence for his view on the importance of environmental regulation for technolog-
ical change in eco-friendly technologies. As Nordhaus (2002, p. 182) points out, “[s]tudies of
environmental and climate-change policy [...] have generally sidestepped the thorny issue of
induced innovation, which refers to the impact of economic activity and policy on research, de-
velopment, and the diffusion of new technologies.” Popp (2002, p. 160) also stresses that there
is “little empirical evidence about the policy-induced development of environmentally friendly
technology”. Jaffe and Palmer (1997) are among the ﬁrst who provide the missing evidence that
environmental regulation as a whole has a positive effect on innovative activities. Only recently
however, researchers have paid attention to the question about the impact of individual policy
instruments on innovation (see e.g. Klaassen et al., 2005; Johnstone et al., 2010).1 Our study
continues to ask how effective environmental policy instruments are in stimulating innovation.
Unlike other studies, we explicitly take the inﬂuence of market liberalisation on the effects of
such instruments into account.
In our understanding, any assessment of environmental regulations has to be made against
the background of the liberalisation of energy markets in the recent decades for two reasons.
Firstly, energy market liberalisation might induce signiﬁcant changes in the energy use patterns,
e.g.openingtheenergymarketstocompetitionintheUKinthe1990sledtoapartialsubstitution
of ‘dirty’ coal by ‘cleaner’ natural gas as an input for electricity generation. Secondly, opening
the energy market to a more market-oriented supply gave also rise to (the necessity of) new reg-
ulation approaches, e.g. the establishment of so-called feed-in tariffs or voluntary agreements.
As van Rooijen and van Wees (2006, p. 62) state concerning the case of the Netherlands, the
“liberalisation of the electricity sector [...] forced changes in the ﬁscal system as it was feared
that reallocation of tax revenues to cover the cost of green energy would disturb the market.”
Our analysis of the effects of environmental regulations in the energy sector on innovation
activities focuses on the wind energy sector in a selection of European countries, Japan and
the US. Although wind potentials differ among (and within) countries, the availability of wind
energyisrelatively independentofgeographicalcharacteristicsascompared toothernon-carbon
energy sources. An example to the point includes Norway which has an undeniable natural
advantage for hydroelectricity or the countries in southern Europe which enjoy more hours of
sunshine relative to countries in northern Europe. In contrast, wind power is much more readily
1 Other studies that furthered the understanding of the relationship between environmental regulations and innova-
tion are e.g. Popp (2006) or Pizer and Popp (2008).3
available in all countries.2 A second reason for studying wind energy is that it is the most
advanced technology among the ‘new’ renewable energy technologies. Both facts together lead
to the conjecture that ﬁrms and researchers in most European countries, Japan and the US have
an incentive to contribute to the technological progress of wind turbines.
In detail, our analysis is organised as follows. In Section 2 we form the hypotheses about the
factors inﬂuencing innovation in the wind turbine sector; and we brieﬂy discuss the employed
model. In Section 3, we describe the dependent and independent variables we use in our esti-
mation. Section 4 presents the estimation results. Section 5 discusses these results in a broader
context and draws some conclusions.
2 Hypotheses and model
2.1 Hypotheses
Usually, a speciﬁc investment opportunity is chosen because it yields higher expected proﬁts
relative to the expected proﬁts of available alternatives. This is true for research and develop-
ment (R&D) as well as the subsequent dissemination and adoption of the new technology if
R&D was successful. Given that the path from the idea for an invention to the market intro-
duction of a new technology is long and highly uncertain, a large number of factors affect the
proﬁtability of investments. This provides policy makers with an equally large number of po-
tential policy instruments to stimulate R&D in the ﬁeld of renewable energy as well as for the
adoption of the new technologies later on. It is therefore unsurprising that policy makers have
introduced different policy instruments, each designed to stimulate innovation and its dissemi-
nation in a different, speciﬁc way.
The policy instruments can broadly be distinguished by the manner in which they affect the
expected proﬁts from investments. Firstly, they may reduce the up-front costs from R&D ex-
penditures or installation costs. Secondly, they may be market-based, i.e. the policy instruments
change the relative prices for either the inputs or the output.3
After the ﬁrst oil price shock in 1973, several countries introduced R&D programs expressly
to search for more efﬁcient ways to harness renewable energy resources. These programs di-
rectly or indirectly reduced the R&D (up-front) costs and were one of the ﬁrst policy instruments
to stimulate renewable energy technology.4 Choosing a non-market based policy instrument to
stimulate innovation in the ﬁeld of renewable energy technology was appropriate during the late
1970s and 1980s. Electricity suppliers were believed to be natural monopolies due to the im-
mense ﬁxed costs and network costs. The market was heavily regulated and electricity suppliers
were state owned in many countries.5 As competition in the electricity market did virtually not
exist and prices were more or less determined by government authorities, policy instruments
that rely on the price mechanism were unnecessary. The R&D programs gradually phased out
during the mid and late 1980s.
2 According to the EEA (2009, p. 48), the majority of the EU-27 member states will most likely have some com-
petitive wind power potential by 2020.
3 Isoard and Soria (2001, p. 631) distinguish between supply-push policies such as R&D and demand-pull policies
in a similar way.
4 R&D programs would directly reduce the R&D costs for private enterprises if the ﬁrms receive direct funding.
The indirect effects of R&D programs stem from the public goods characteristics of knowledge. Once an inven-
tion has been made, the re-creation is possible at lower costs. Patent laws regulate the use of patented knowledge.
However, experimentation alone, especially for the purpose of further developments, does frequently not consti-
tute a patent infringement (Weiss, 2010).
5 In some countries such as Germany, the market was divided into geographically distinct sub-markets; and each
sub-market was served by a monopoly.4
As more and more countries chose to open the electricity market for competition, new policy
instruments had to be created as ﬁrms now acted in a competitive environment where customers
respond to price differences. There are arguments both for and against the hypothesis that
stronger competition is conducive to increased innovation. Schumpeter (1942) argues that ﬁrms
in a competitive environment lack the proﬁts to pursue R&D. Arrow (1962a) on the other hand
points out that stronger competition may well induce ﬁrms to seek more efﬁcient production
methods in order to gain advantage over their competitors. Although we expect that the liber-
alisation of the electricity market will have a positive effect on the innovative activity for wind
turbines, we also believe that the relationship between liberalisation, regulation and innovation
is complex.6
Some of the regulation instruments such as taxation, R&D funding and providing grants or
low interest loans for installing wind turbines have been extensively used even before the energy
market liberalisation. Other instruments, such as e.g. certain tax exemptions for consumers
seem to appear only after markets have been opened to competition. Therefore, we expect that
certain policy instruments will be more effective if markets are already open to competition. It is
reasonable to assume that policy instruments that affect prices will depend more on competition
than non-price-based instruments.
Wind as an energy source has been used for centuries. Yet, the technology was extremely
inefﬁcient to generate electricity. Substantial technological progress was necessary to bring
production cost even close to the cost for generating electricity from traditional sources. These
technological achievements are largely a consequence of the ﬁrst oil price shock and the associ-
ated efforts to become less dependent on oil imports.
When a technology is still relatively young and large improvements are made, being the ﬁrst
ﬁrm in a market ensures a large market share.7 Since wind is a ubiquitous resource and because
the technological knowledge was at least initially not widely available, foreign demand for wind
turbines might increase R&D and therefore patenting activities. The argument is supported by
the fact that wind quality widely differs so that wind turbines developed for Europe might be
less efﬁcient in e.g. India or China. Consequently, it might be necessary to adapt wind turbine
technology to local conditions. Usually, ﬁrms that export valuable technology will patent their
technology in the importing country. Table 1 below shows that there are remarkable differences
in foreign patenting activities between the countries.
2.2 The model
Since innovation activities itself cannot be measured, it has become common practice to use
either inputs for or outputs of innovation activities instead.8 Input measures build on the hy-
pothesis that increasing e.g. R&D expenditures will increase the number of inventions and inno-
vations. On the other hand, innovative activities may result in patentable inventions. Assuming
that on average a ﬁxed proportion of inventions is patented, patent applications or patent grants
are an appropriate output measure for innovation activities. In recent years, researchers have
increasingly relied on patent counts. Because of the availability of data as well as the amount of
additional information, e.g. on patentees, in an internationally standardised form, we decided
6 Swezey and Bird (2000) stress the role for liberalisation in electricity markets for the rise in the supply of green
power in the US. As Bird and Sumner (2010, p. 21) point out: “Initially, green power marketers in competitive
markets were often forced to offer existing renewable energy sources because of a lack of new renewable energy
supplies, but most marketers now offer primarily new renewable energy”.
7 According to Kristinsson and Rao (2007), Danish ﬁrms have a world market share of about 40 per cent.
8 See e.g. Griliches (1990) for a discussion on the relative strengths of both methods.5
to use the number of patent applications to study the effects of environmental regulations on the
progress of renewable energy technologies.
Poisson processes are often thought of describing random arrival events. Because of the ob-
vious similarity to innovation processes, they have been used in the theoretical literature on
innovation and patent races.9 For random variables governed by a Poisson process, residuals
would not be normally distributed so that standard least squares regressions would yield bi-
ased results. Therefore, a Poison regression is a better choice. However, a Poisson regression
presumes that the mean and the variance for the (count) random variable are identical. This
is assumption is rather restrictive and often violated in patent count estimations, i.e. we might
encounter the problem of over-dispersion. Therefore, a negative binomial regression is usually
used (Allison and Waterman, 2002).
We know that patent counts will depend on country-speciﬁc differences, i.e. mainly on coun-
try size and on the inclination to patent. Therefore, a panel data negative binomial regression
with country ﬁxed effects would be appropriate regression model. According to Allison and
Waterman (2002) and Guimar˜ aes (2008), the negative binomial regression model of Hausman
et al. (1984) which has been incorporated into a number of statistical software programs relies
on an assumption that is rarely met. Allison and Waterman (2002) therefore suggest to use
the unconditional negative binomial regression model with country dummy variables to account
for the ﬁxed effects. We follow the suggestion of Allison and Waterman (2002) and use the
following, simpliﬁed version of our estimation equation:
lnE(PatCnti) = ln(popi) + (Policyi) + (Marketi) + (Investmenti) + i: (1)
E(PatCnti) denotes the expected total patent applications. Since larger countries tend to apply
more often for patents, we explicitly account for the differences in country size by including
the natural logarithm of the population ln(popi) for observation i in the estimation. Further, we
use a number of Policy variables as well as controls for innovation incentives that are naturally
present in the Market and direct Investment incentives such as R&D expenditures (see below).
; and  are the vectors of the estimation coefﬁcients associated with the Policy, Market and
Investment variables. i represent the country dummies for observation i.
In the next section, the variables that are included in the estimation are discussed in detail.
3 Data
3.1 Patent data
Patent applications collect a vast number of information about the invention as well as the
inventors and assignees. We use the number of all patent applications for wind motors that were
made by nationals or ﬁrms from Denmark (DK), France (FR), Germany (DE), Japan (JP), the
Netherlands (NL), Spain (ES), Sweden (SE), the United Kingdom (GB) and the US as a de-
pendent variable. To generate the patent count data (PatCnt), we extract all patent applications
whose applicants resided in the considered countries and that were ﬁled under the international
patent classiﬁcation number F03D (wind motors) between 1970 and 2009 from the worldwide
patent database of the European Patent Ofﬁce (PATSTAT).10 Due to the nature of patents and
9 See e.g. Loury (1979) for an early example, and Reinganum (1992), Scotchmer (2004) or Weiss (2010) for
overviews over innovation and patent race models.
10 Due to missing data for some of the explanatory variables, the estimation includes only patent applications made
between 1980 and 2008.6
Table 1: Summary statistics for wind turbine patent applications between 1980 and 2008
Country Number Mean Min Max per mil pop
Germany (DE) 3638 125:45 16 389 1:58
US (US) 2636 90:90 18 348 0:33
Denmark (DK) 1041 35:90 1 205 6:64
France (FR) 669 23:07 2 57 0:39
Spain (ES) 641 22:10 0 100 0:52
UK (GB) 592 20:41 2 87 0:34
Japan (JP) 563 19:41 0 91 0:15
Netherlands (NL) 406 14:00 0 60 0:88
Sweden (SE) 399 13:76 1 41 1:56
certain peculiarities of the PATSTAT database, a number of issues arise that have to be ad-
dressed. Firstly, patents that are not related to the wind energy technology might be included in
the data set. This particular problem is minimal since the technology class F03D is exclusively
for wind motors.
Second and more importantly, relevant patents might not have been included in the data set.
This problem might e.g. occur with basic technologies where all ﬁelds of application are not
yet known. The patent for the broad technology would not be included in our data set if it is
discovered only after the patent was granted that the technology can also be applied to wind
turbines. Again, there is no reason to believe that wind turbine inventions are systematically
more prone to the exclusion of relevant patent applications than other technology ﬁelds so that it
will not unduly bias our estimation. Another, more serious reason for the exclusion of relevant
patents is due to missing information on the patent applicant’s country of residence. In fact,
there are quite a few cases in which the applicant’s country information is missing. There
is no obvious way to deal with the problem. Dechezleprˆ etre et al. (2011) e.g. assign patents
without country information proportional to the overall distribution of patent application across
all countries. We decided against this approach and used only those patent applications that
can unambiguously be traced to applicants of the considered countries. We believe that the
proportion of missing relevant patent applications due to missing assignee country information
is small since our data set accounts for almost half of the patent applications in the world.
Finally, applicants may apply for patent protection for the same invention in different coun-
tries. Since we do not restrict patent applications to those made in a single country, our initial
patent data include multiple applications for the same invention. Fortunately, applicants have
to indicate whether they applied for the same invention in a different country before and, thus,
claim priority for the ﬁrst application.11 This makes it possible to eliminate the multiple counts
for an invention from the initial patent data.
Table 1 summarises the patent application data for the nine countries considered here. As it
can be seen, the total number of patent applications for wind turbines differ remarkably between
countries. Sweden has the fewest number of patent applications for wind turbines. Yet, it has
almost twice as many patent applications per million inhabitants as the Netherlands. On the
other hand, although Germany has even more wind turbine patent applications than the much
larger US, it has only slightly more patent applications per million inhabitants than Sweden.
In this respect, Denmark is the most remarkable country which has accumulated more than six
patent applications per million population over a time period of almost 30 years. Undeniably,
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Figure 1: Patent applications per million of inhabitants in Germany, Sweden and the UK
Table 2: Patent applications by region of application between 1970 and 2009
North Am (US) M&S Am Asia (China) Europe Own Total
in per cent
DE 4:69 (3:40) 0:95 8:58 (5:95) 84:81 51:69 3798
DK 8:98 (5:99) 1:54 15:06 (14:07) 72:96 38:66 1102
ES 5:33 (3:75) 2:31 8:93 (8:07) 82:13 61:53 694
FR 3:86 (3:41) 0:34 1:93 (1:14) 93:52 79:09 880
GB 8:10 (6:85) 0:78 4:98 (3:58) 85:51 61:99 642
NL 5:71 (3:88) 0:23 7:76 (7:31) 85:39 36:99 438
SE 6:80 (6:14) 1:75 4:39 (1:97) 86:40 62:72 456
JP 21:71 (19:32) 0:85 62:91 (16:07) 14:53 34:53 585
US 53:98 (51:07) 2:11 11:31 (8:30) 31:86 51:07 3227
countrysizeasmeasuredbyitspopulationexplainspartoftheobserveddifferenceinthenumber
of patents. However, it is equally clear that other factors affect patenting activities.
Figure 1 illustrates the argument by displaying the number of wind motor patent applications
per million inhabitants in Germany, Sweden and the UK. Especially in Sweden and to a lesser
degree in Germany, a rise in the number of patents per million inhabitants can be observed in
the years following the oil price shocks in the 1970s and again from the mid 1990s on. Other
countries, such as the United Kingdom show little variation in the number of patents per million
inhabitants.
Table 2 shows where the applicants patent. Again, we ﬁnd an astonishingly diverse interna-
tional patenting pattern. Except for Danish applicants, more than 80 per cent of patent appli-
cations with European applicants are made within Europe. The majority of European patent
applications with European assignees are exclusively made in their own country. On average,
less than 20 per cent of patent applications with European assignees are made in non-European
countries ﬁrst. In contrast, over 30 per cent of applications with either Japanese or US American8
assignees are made outside their own continent. While for Japanese applicants the most impor-
tant destinations are other Asian countries and North America, Europe is the most important
patenting region for US American assignees.
Two factors may help to explain the pattern of international patent applications. Firstly, shar-
ing a common language and cultural links explain part of the observed pattern. Usually, patent
applications have to be translated into the language of the application country. For a British
inventor, it is thus less costly to apply for a patent in the US instead of e.g. in Mexico. The re-
verse will be true for Spanish inventors. Secondly, the observed patent application pattern might
mirror international trade patterns. Inventors naturally wish to protect their intellectual property
in the countries to which they expect to export their wind turbines. Therefore, expected demand
for wind turbines might also be a factor that stimulates innovative activities, especially because
it might be necessary to adapt technology to local (wind) conditions.
3.2 Explanatory variables
3.2.1 Policy instruments
Over the past decades, policy makers have developed a large variety of policy instruments
which are designed to increase the use of environmental friendly technologies. Usually, the in-
struments aim at increasing the expected proﬁts from investments into environmentally friendly
technologies in a speciﬁc way, e.g. by reducing investment costs or by increasing the price for
electricity that isgenerated from non-renewable sources. Therefore, most countriesuse a combi-
nation of different instruments to facilitate research and development of environmental friendly
technologies on the one hand as well as their deployment and also the demand for electricity
from renewable resources.
To assess the different policy instruments, we construct six policy variables. The ﬁrst vari-
able is feed-in tariffs (FIT) which some countries, notably Germany, Spain and the Netherlands
have introduced. Different from premium prices (see below) feed-in tariffs are ﬁxed prices that
electricity producers receive if they rely on renewable resources. They are designed to reduce
the cost disadvantage that renewable energy technologies still have vis-` a-vis traditional elec-
tricity generating technologies in a predictable and reliable manner. Since the ‘new’ renewable
technologies differ immensely in their cost efﬁciency, tariffs usually differ across technologies.
Feed-in tariffs are paid for a certain period of time and may be constant or decreasing over
time as e.g. in Germany. Since the duration over which the feed-in tariffs are paid differs across
countries as well as within countries at different times, we decided to use the annuity of the
stream of paid tariffs instead of the tariff for the ﬁrst year as in e.g. Johnstone et al. (2010). This
enables us to account for the decreasing feed-in tariffs over time which Germany introduced
from the very beginning. This degression has expressly been introduced to encourage continued
technological progress in the ﬁeld of renewable energy and has been sharpened repeatedly over
the years.
To construct the FIT variable for Germany, IEA data are used for the years 1989 to 2000.12
From 2000 on, we relied on various versions of the Renewable Energy Source Act (Gesetz f¨ ur
den Vorrang Erneuerbarer Energien, 2000). A series of Royal Decrees provided the information
on the Spanish feed-in tariffs. Finally, the data for the Netherlands has been obtained from the
NL Agency.13
Including too many binary variables may cause problems with collinearity so that it is always
preferable to use continuous variables. However, due to the large number of different policy
12 See IEA (2011) for the years 1989 and 1990 and IEA (2004, p 310) for the years 1991 to 2000.
13 See NL Agency (2011) and SDE (2009) for the tariffs.9
instruments it is not possible to construct continuous variables for the remaining ﬁve policy
variables. The binary variables below take the value one when the particular policy instrument
was active in the particular country and year and zero otherwise. Again, we mainly rely on
the policy database of the International Energy Agency (IEA) to construct the following pol-
icy variables:14 premium prices (PP), grants, investment tax credits (ITax), tax exemption for
consumers (DTax) and renewable energy certiﬁcates (REC).
Premium prices (PP) also compensate ﬁrms for the cost disadvantages that renewable energy
technologies still have vis-` a-vis traditional electricity generating technologies. Different from
feed-in tariffs however, ﬁrms that use renewable energy sources for the production of electricity
receive a premium over the market price rather than a ﬁxed price.15 Consequently, when elec-
tricity prices fall e.g. due to a decrease in the world market prices for coal, natural oil or gas, the
price received for ‘green’ electricity decreases as well. In principle, nothing prevents the prices
for ‘green’ electricity to fall below the costs of producing it.16 This may encourage continued
R&D to discover more cost effective technologies, but it will also raise uncertainty for investors.
Grants or low interest-rate loans are used by all countries included in our study. They directly
lower the (up front) costs for extending the capacity of wind energy and thereby increase the
expected proﬁts for investors.
Investment tax credits (ITax) are another, less often used policy measure. They can take
different forms. In the Netherlands, the VAMIL Depreciation scheme leaves the decision to
ﬁrms as to when they want to depreciated the investments into renewable energy technologies.
The US also allow special depreciation schemes for renewable energy equipment. In addition,
ﬁrms are also eligible for certain tax exemptions in the US.
Another option to indirectly increase the price a ﬁrm can charge for electricity generated
from renewable resources is a tax exemption for consumers (DTax). This policy measure is usu-
ally introduced with an energy tax. Different from Germany, Dutch and Swedish consumers of
renewable energy are exempt from energy taxation. This gives electricity producers the oppor-
tunity to charge consumers a premium of at most the energy tax over the electricity generated in
the traditional way.
In recent years, many countries introduced a certiﬁcation system and tradeable Renewable
Energy Certiﬁcates (REC). The former intends to guarantee that the electricity is indeed gen-
erated from renewable resources. This is especially important since electricity suppliers may
wish to import electricity that was generated from renewable resources. Some of the REC sys-
tems, however, are purely voluntary and seem not to have any effect beyond certifying that the
electricity has renewable resources as an origin. We therefore include only the REC schemes of
the United Kingdom, the Netherlands, Sweden, Japan and the US because either producers or
consumers have to buy certiﬁcates.17
In addition to the policy variables above, two additional binary variables are used to capture
the potential effects of the ratiﬁcation of the Kyoto Protocol (Kyoto) and electricity market
liberalisation (Lib).
Many countries introduced different forms of energy/environmental taxes (EnvTax). These
taxes are likely to change the relative prices between traditionally produced electricity and elec-
tricity generated by renewable energy technology in favour of the latter. Therefore, they are
likely to change the incentives to innovate in all renewable energy technologies. As a further
14 See IEA (2004) for policies up to 2004 and IEA (2011) for more recent regulations.
15 Premium prices may be indirect, e.g. in form of a energy tax exemption as in Sweden and the United Kingdom.
16 Interestingly, most countries specify a upper limit for the market price for which the premium price is still paid.
For any market price exceeding this limit, ﬁrms are only paid the market price. In contrast, countries rarely specify
a lower limit that guarantees a ﬁxed minimum price for the production of electricity using renewable resources.
17 See Plumb and Zamﬁr (2009) for a more detailed information on the REC systems for the European countries.10
proxy, we therefore include environmental tax revenues (EnvTax) in million A C. For the European
countries, we use the data from the Statistical Ofﬁce of the European Commission (Eurostat)
which is available for the years 1980-2008. For Japan and the US, we constructed a variable that
corresponds to Eurostat’s deﬁnition of environmental tax revenues from the OECD database on
taxes (OECD, 2010c). Table 3 gives an overview over the statistical properties of the variables
to be included in the estimation.
Table 3: Descriptive statistics of explanatory variables (1980-2008)
Variable Obs. Mean SD Min Max
PP (B) 261 0:364 0:482 0 1
DTax (B) 261 0:096 0:295 0 1
REC (B) 261 0:215 0:411 0 1
Price (B) 261 0:456 0:499 0 1
FIT (A Ccents/kWh) 261 0:017 0:031 0 0:101
Price 2 (B) 261 0:582 0:494 0 1
Grants (B) 261 0:490 0:501 0 1
ITax (B) 261 0:203 0:403 0 1
NPriceP (B) 261 0:563 0:497 0 1
Lib (B) 261 0:264 0:442 0 1
Kyoto (B) 261 0:215 0:411 0 1
EnvTaxpc (A C) 261 542:23 420:87 63:39 2481:47
WRDpc (A C) 250 0:44:2 0:641 0 4:739
Open (%) 261 44:31 21:26 13:19 114:77
Im71 (bil USD) 261 0:422 0:462 0:070 1:716
ExR71 (USD/ per mil GDP) 256 0:041 0:046 0:000 0:204
EnPI (2005 = 100) 261 74:195 23:607 21:108 141:420
NetEImpc (Mtoe/ mil pop) 261 1:731 1:182  1:939 3:750
OilP (A C/1000l) 261 392:96 213:82 68:09 1237:16
B: Binary variable; Mtoe: Megaton oil equivalent
3.2.2 Other explanatory variables
Policy instruments that aim at stimulating innovation activities in renewable energy technolo-
gies are usually introduced because the natural market incentives are believed to be too weak
to achieve the desired results. To obtain reliable estimation results, we therefore control for a
number of variables that are likely to affect the incentives to innovate. Foremost among them
are technology-speciﬁc R&D expenditures, which are likely to have the most direct effect on
the number of patent applications. It can be expected that the number of patent applications
will rise when more resources are spent on wind energy R&D. We use IEA data on total R&D
expenditures per capita (WRDpc) in A C at prices of 2009.
As mentioned above, the expected foreign demand for wind turbines may be an additional
incentivetoinnovate, especiallysinceitmightbenecessarytoadaptthewindturbinetechnology
to local characteristics. Ideally, we would like to have a measure for the expected future total
demand for wind turbines. Since we do not have information on ﬁrms’ expectations, we use
one of three variables as proxy. For the ﬁrst variable ExR71, we collect data on exports for
commodity group 71888, which includes wind turbines, in million US$ (OECD, 2010d). To
account for differences in country size, we use the ratio of the exports to million of the gross
national product in US$ and current prices (OECD, 2010a). This variable has the disadvantage
that it measures the part of the total world demand that a countries has satisﬁed rather than11
the world demand itself. Therefore, we construct a second variable Im71 by calculating the
imports in billion US$ of commodities in group 71888 of all OECD countries that originate
from OECD countries (OECD, 2010d). The variable Im71 does not include the demand for
non-OECD countries. Since most of the trade in commodity group 71888 actually takes place
between industrialised countries, we feel conﬁdent the OECD demand for wind turbines is a
good proxy for the world demand. Unfortunately, data on both variables are not available for
a number of countries, especially in the 1980s. Because the aggregate trade ﬁgures are more
reliable than imports and export in a single ﬁve digit commodity group, we also include the
imports and exports in per cent of the GDP in current prices (Open) (OECD, 2010a,d).
We also include the consumer price index for energy (EnPI) to account for changing national
energy prices (OECD, 2010b). Since the consumer price index for energy is calculated from
totalconsumerprices, itdoesnotonlyincreasewithrisingenergyprices, butalsowithincreasing
taxes. Finally, we control for countries’ self sufﬁciency concerning domestic energy provision.
Firms in countries that are insufﬁciently endowed with traditional energy resources might have
anticipated that world energy prices are increasing and that these increases in turn will raise
the proﬁtability of renewable energy technologies. A good measure of self sufﬁciency is the
net energy imports in Mtoe per million inhabitants (NetEImpc) which is provided by the IEA
(2010a). In addition, we include the price for 1000 litre light oil (OilP) in A C as a proxy for the
expected world market price developments.
4 Estimation results
4.1 The effect of electricity market liberalisation
We estimate different speciﬁcations of equation (1). The base model B1 is presented in the
ﬁrst column of Table 4. In addition to investment, market and policy variables we include the
dummy variable for the ratiﬁcation of the Kyoto Protocol.
We ﬁnd a positive and signiﬁcant effect of wind-technology-speciﬁc R&D expenditure per
capita (WRDpc) on the number of wind turbine patents. This result is unsurprising since R&D
expenditures are the most important input factor for any research process. We also ﬁnd that total
demand for wind turbines in OECD countries (IM71) has a large, positive and highly signiﬁcant
effect on innovations. This conﬁrms our hypothesis, that the ﬁrst-mover advantage on the world
market exerts a powerful incentive to innovate and possibly adapt the wind energy technology
that has mainly been developed for European countries and the US to local circumstances. As
expected, ratifying the Kyoto Protocol exerts a positive inﬂuence on innovation activities. From
an international policy perspective, the signiﬁcance of the Kyoto Protocol can hardly be over-
estimated. After long and difﬁcult negotiations, a majority of countries ﬁnally acknowledged
that greenhouse gas emissions have large and global negative external effects; now, they were
prepared for cautious action. The signing and ratiﬁcation of the Protocol certainly signalled a
policy shift in many countries. It became clear that relative (energy) prices would irreversibly
changeandthatareversalofenvironmentalpolicymeasureswasratherunlikely. TheKyotoPro-
tocol has induced policy makers to introduce new policy instruments. Consequently, it changed
the expectations on the proﬁtability of renewable energy technology which is likely to increase
innovative activities.
At the ﬁrst glance, it might seem surprising that we ﬁnd a negative and signiﬁcant effect of
the energy price index (EnPI) on the patenting behaviour. After all, using renewable energy
technology to generate electricity is more proﬁtable when prices are high. However, the neg-
ative sign may simply indicate that ﬁrms are actively looking for more efﬁcient wind turbines12
Table 4: Estimation results: Effect of electricity market liberalisation
B1 B2 B3 B4 B5 B6
WRDpc 0:3248 0:3954 0:3399 0:2292 0:3398 0:3376
(0:034) (0:009) (0:026) (0:041) (0:040) (0:027)
Im71 0:8742 0:7415 0:9163 1:0562 1:0563 0:9039
(0:000) (0:000) (0:000) (0:000) (0:000) (0:000)
Kyoto 0:6126 0:6363 0:6416 0:5360 0:5372 0:6219
(0:000) (0:000) (0:000) (0:000) (0:000) (0:000)
EnPI  0:0086  0:0087  0:0063  0:0127  0:0129  0:0078







EnvTaxpc 0:0013 0:0011 0:0014 0:0011 0:0011 0:0013





FIT, Lib = 0  0:8312
(0:581)
FIT, Lib = 1 5:7662
(0:025)
LogLik  944:4  942:5  945  938:4  938:3  941
AIC 1921 1920 1920 1909 1911 1916
N 250 250 250 250 250 250
p-value in parentheses
 : p < 0:05;  : p < 0:01;    : p < 0:00
when energy prices are low. As expected, the coefﬁcient for environmental tax revenues (En-
vTaxpc) is positive and signiﬁcant. They change the relative prices for energy and electricity in
favour of ‘green’ energy sources. As a consequence, expected proﬁts from innovations in wind
technology increase and investments may be redirected from more traditional research projects
to e.g. innovation for more efﬁcient wind turbines.
Finally, the coefﬁcient for the oil price (OilP) is positive, but insigniﬁcant. Therefore, we
may conclude that countries which are naturally poor in traditional energy resources do not
systematically put higher efforts into innovations in renewable energy resources.
In model B2 used net energy imports per capita (NetEImpc) as a measure of lacking self
sufﬁciency. In addition we also included a time trend (year). In model B1 this was unnecessary
since the oil price is highly correlated with time. The results conﬁrm that changing the measure
for a country’s exposure to ‘costly’ energy imports from the oil price to net energy imports per
capita does not change the estimation results. Net energy imports per capita do not seem to
have an effect on wind turbine innovation. There is also no evidence that patenting activities
are independently increasing over time. All other variables are found to have an effect similar
in magnitude and signiﬁcance as in model B1. We therefore drop the oil price, the net energy
imports and the time trend from further consideration. The resulting model conﬁguration is
found in model B3. Again, we ﬁnd that the effects have a similar magnitude and signiﬁcance as13
the variables in model B1.
For models B4 and B5, theoretical results are compatible with a positive as well as a negative
coefﬁcient for the energy market liberalisation (Lib). We ﬁnd a strong positive and signiﬁcant
coefﬁcient which would support the ﬁndings of Arrow (1962b). However, the coefﬁcient for the
feed-in tariffs (Fit) is positive but insigniﬁcant. The positive sign of the coefﬁcient supports the
ﬁndings of S¨ oderholm and Klaassen (2007) who stress the importance of feed-in tariffs in the
innovation and diffusion process. Other studies such as e.g. Johnstone et al. (2010) ﬁnd little
empirical evidence for a strong and positive effect of feed-in tariffs on innovation.18
We might expect that price-based policy instruments such as feed-in tariffs are more effective
if the energy market is open to competition. We test this hypothesis in model B6. Here we ﬁnd
again an insigniﬁcant effect of feed-in tariffs when energy markets are not open to competition.
In contrast, feed-in tariffs have a strong and signiﬁcant effect if there is competition, i.e. after
the energy market liberalisation.
4.2 Price and non-price based policy instruments
We are ﬁrst studying the interaction between energy market liberalisation and different price-
basedpolicyinstruments. TheresultsarepresentedinTable5intheAppendix. Forconvenience,
we reproduced the results for the interaction between feed-in tariffs and liberalisation from
Table 4 as model P1 and P2.
In models P3 and P4, we repeat the exercise for premium prices PP. Except for Spain, most
countries use either premium prices or feed-in tariffs to stimulate the deployment of wind en-
ergy technology. In Spain, ﬁrms that are under the special regime can choose between both
options. As explained above, the variable PP does not only record which country introduces
premium prices, but also includes policy measures such as e.g. an exemption from energy tax or
the value-added tax that would have the same effect as premium prices. When neglecting any
interaction between energy market liberalisation and premium prices, we ﬁnd the now familiar
pattern. Both variables have a positive coefﬁcient but only liberalisation has a signiﬁcant in-
ﬂuence on the patenting activities. P4 reports the results for the model speciﬁcation that takes
the interaction between premium prices and market liberalisation into account. Again, we ﬁnd
that liberalisation alone has a positive and signiﬁcant effect on innovation. Premium prices in
absence of energy market liberalisation have a positive, but insigniﬁcant coefﬁcient. In contrast,
the combined effect of premium prices and energy market liberalisation on innovation activities
is large and signiﬁcant.
Finally, consider models P5 and P6 which test the same hypothesis for the price policy
dummy variable (PriceP), which combines a dummy variable for feed-in tariffs, premium prices,
renewable energy certiﬁcates and tax exemptions for consumers. Different from the models P1
and P3, the price policy variable has a positive and signiﬁcant effect on the number of patents
even if the interaction between price-based policy instruments and energy market liberalisation
are disregarded. Model P6 again shows a positive but and weakly signiﬁcant effect for the price
policy variable when markets are not open to competition. The combined effect of price-based
policy variables and energy market liberalisation is much larger and highly signiﬁcant. There-
fore, we conclude that market-based policy instruments are more efﬁcient when energy markets
have been liberalised.
Observe also that the individual price-based policy instruments in models P1-P4 have almost
the same explanatory power. In contrast, combining all price-based policy variables in P5 and
18 In Johnstone et al. (2010), feed-in tariffs are consistently positive and signiﬁcant only for solar energy and across
all renewable energy sources. For wind energy the feed-in tariffs either have the wrong sign or are insigniﬁcant.14
P6 leads to a slightly better ﬁt. This suggests that none of the price-based policy instruments
shows a clear superiority over other price-based alternatives. Rather, it seems important that
they have been implemented and preferably in an energy market that is open to competition.
In Table 6 in that Appendix, we compare the results for no interaction between energy market
liberalisation and certain non-price-based variables with the results for an assumed interaction
between both variables. Model N1 shows that both grants and energy market liberalisation have
a positive and signiﬁcant effect on innovation activities. Model N2 conﬁrms that the coefﬁcients
for grants and low interest rate loans remain positive and signiﬁcant independent whether or not
the energy markets are open to competition. Models N3 and N4 show that essentially the same
holds true for the broader non-price dummy variable (NPriceP), which combines investment tax
credits and grants as policy variables. Comparing models N1 to N4 we ﬁnd that even the size
of the respective coefﬁcients are very similar. The presented results conﬁrm our hypothesis that
non-price based variables are also effective in absence of energy market liberalisation.
Including non-price-based policy instruments instead of prices-based variables increases the
ﬁt of the model. This leads us to combine price-based and non-price-based instruments in
Table 7. Again we ﬁnd the now familiar pattern. Model PN1 shows that the coefﬁcient for
grants is positive and highly signiﬁcant. Feed-in tariffs have a large and signiﬁcant effect on
innovation activities when energy markets are liberalised. However, combining both, price and
non-price policy instruments does not improve the ﬁt of the model.
5 Conclusion
We provide a panel data study to assess the impact of environmental policy instruments on
innovation activities for wind turbines in a selection of European countries, Japan and the US
between 1980 and 2008. Our study contributes to the existing literature in explicitly controlling
for the effects that energy market liberalisation had on innovative activities. Experience indi-
cates that liberalisation in the energy sector tends to affect the deployment of renewable energy
supply (see e.g. Swezey and Bird, 2000, for experiences in the US). By using patent count data
for selected countries, we pursue the task of determining which policy instruments and condi-
tions are most favorable in bringing about innovation and technological change in wind energy
technology.
We did not ﬁnd any evidence that resource-poor countries systematically invest more in re-
newable energy technology. We therefore conclude that world energy markets are performing
well enough and that there are no systematic price differences. The development of oil prices
seems to have little effect on innovation activities for wind turbines. In contrast, environmental
tax revenues were found to have a positive and highly signiﬁcant effect on patent activity. These
ﬁndings seem plausible, especially since we consider environmental tax revenues to be a proxy
for the extent of relative energy price changes in favour of electricity generated by renewable
resources.
As in previous studies, we ﬁnd strong evidence that technology-speciﬁc R&D expenditures
increase patenting activities. Margolis and Kammen (1999) e.g. describe a strong correlation
between public and private investments in energy R&D and energy related patents in the US be-
tween 1976 and 1996 and criticise the decline of energy R&D funding, both in scale and diver-
sity, throughout the industrialized world during this period. Fortunately, as the IEA (2010b) re-
cently reported, public investment in low-carbon technology research, development and demon-
stration is increasing again in the industrialized world, but it estimates that in order to prevent
dangerous climate change, respective government funding will need to be much higher than
current levels. We also ﬁnd a strong positive effect of the ratiﬁcation of the Kyoto Protocol on15
patent activity in the renewable energy sector.
At the outset we formed three hypotheses. Firstly, we argued that energy market liberalisation
has an effect on innovation activity. Secondly, we surmised that energy market liberalisation
may have a direct and an indirect effect on innovation activities. Opening up the energy markets
to competition may have made price-based policy instruments such as feed-in tariffs or premium
price more effective. Lastly, we expected that total world demand for wind turbines may also
affect innovation activities for wind energy technology.
Total foreign demand seems indeed to increase the number of patent applications. As sug-
gested by the international patenting pattern, patentees holding wind turbines patents seem to
protect their technology in export markets. This would conﬁrm the related ﬁndings of Kristins-
son and Rao (2007). Since efﬁcient wind energy technology is relatively young, the motive of
reaping proﬁts from a ﬁrst-mover advantage might be the driving force.
Concerning the effect of energy market liberalisation, we ﬁnd very strong evidence for the hy-
pothesis that single price-based policy variables as e.g. feed-in tariffs as well as a combination
of price-based policy instruments are more effective in energy markets that allow for compe-
tition. This might suggest that the price-based policy instruments encourage ﬁrms to continue
in seeking more efﬁcient technologies to harness wind energy. The same effect could not be
found for the non-price-based policy instruments. This conﬁrms our supposition that non-price-
based policy instruments are largely independent of whether or not energy markets are open to
competition.
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Table 7: Estimation results for price-based and non-price-based policy instruments
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